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Gorman: Evidence: Testimony Recounting a Translated Converstation Not Hea

EVIDENCE: TESTIMONY RECOUNTING A
TRANSLATED CONVERSATION NOT HEARSAY IF
IMPLIED AGENCY EXISTS
Chao v. State, 453 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984)
Appellant was charged with attempted first degree murder.' The arresting
officer requested that appellant's uncle act as an interpreter between the officer
and the appellant. 2 At trial, the interpreter testified that although he could not
recall the substance of the conversation, 3 his translation was truthful and accurate. 4 Defense counsel raised a hearsay objection to the officer's restatement
of the translated confession. 6 The judge overruled the objection 7 and the trial
court found the appellant guilty.' Florida's Third District Court of Appeal
affirmed the trial court's ruling and HELD, a police officer's testimony recounting a translated confession is not hearsay. 9
Testimony recounting an extrajudicial translated conversation has generally
been considered inadmissible hearsay.' 0 Admitting such testimony may undermine basic hearsay policies of minimizing mistakes in memory and perception."

1. 453 So. 2d 878 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984). "The victim, [appellant's] girlfriend until a short
time before the shooting ... , testified that the defendant came to her house, pointed the gun at
her and shot her." Id.at 879 n.1.
2. Id. at 879. The arresting officer spoke and understood only English, but the appellant
spoke and understood only Spanish. The appellant's uncle, however, was present when the appellant
was arrested. The uncle spoke and understood both languages. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.The uncle testified that at the officer's request, he-read the Miranda warnings to the
appellant and the appellant acknowledged that he understood his Miranda rights. The uncle stated
that he truthfully translated the questions and answers between the officer and the appellant. Id.
5. Id. Defense counsel objected, claiming there was no proper predicate laid qualifying
appellant's uncle as an interpreter and that anything the interpreter told the officer would be hearsay.
This objection was sustained. The court later determined the officer's testimony (since the interpreter
seemed to understand the officer's questions and the appellant's answers) was a proper predicate,
and allowed the officer to testify as to what the interpreter told him. Id. n.2.
6. Id.The officer testified that appellant's uncle, acting as an interpreter, stated that the
appellant said he shot the victim "because he loves her and wants no other man to have her."
Id.at 879.
7. Id. The Third District Court of Appeal found that the trial court's original sustaining
of the defense's objection on improper predicate grounds alone was an implicit overruling of the
hearsay objection. Thus it was not necessary to renew the hearsay objection to preserve it for
appellate review when the improper predicate was cured. Id. at 879 n.2.
8. Id.at 879.
9. Id.at 879-80.
10. 2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EvIOENCE 5 271 (13th ed. 1972) ("A witness cannot testify to
an extrajudicial statement by another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but
translated for him by an interpreter, ...
as such repetition ...
of what the other person said
would be hearsay.").
11. MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE 5 245 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (stating "[tihe factors upon
which the credibility of testimony depends are the perception, memory and narration of the witness."
All of these factors affect accuracy). See infra note 54.
1067
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The testifying witness does not have firsthand knowledge' 2 because he is unable
to understand the statement as originally conceived.' 3 Thus, recounted translated
testimony produces a greater than normal margin for error. In addition, juries
may not understand the proper weight to give recounted translated testimony.4
Some courts have, however, held such testimony admissible on an agency the15

ory.

Florida courts established the agency exception to the hearsay rule early this
century.' 6 In Meacham v. State, the Florida Supreme Court held that two parties,
speaking through an interpreter, necessarily adopt the interpreter's words as
their own. 7 The court reversed the defendant's embezzlement conviction, 8 holding the trial court had erred in excluding the testimony regarding the translated
conversation.' 9 The court noted the witness' dependency on the interpreter's
translation. 2" Nevertheless, it held such testimony admissible2 ' because an interpreter's testimony is assumed to be trustworthy. 22 In the court's opinion, use
of interpreted conversation as evidence affected the weight, not the admissibility
of the testimony.

21

12. See, e.g., Garcia v. Nebraska, 159 Neb. 571, 579, 68 N.W.2d 151, 159 (1955) (citing
Rhode Island v. Terline, 23 R.I. 530, 539, 51 A. 204, 208 (1902)) ("Where a witness is offered
to testify to the statements of another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but
translated for him by an interpreter, such witness is not qualified, because he does not speak from
personal knowledge.").
13. See, e.g., Idaho v. Fong Loon, 29 Idaho 248, 260-61, 158 P. 233, 237 (1916) (a statement
made through an interpreter was inadmissible where the witness understood the statement, not as
originally given but as translated by the interpreter).
14. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, § 353 ("The admission of evidence in a
jury trial is often considered the last effective legal control over the . . . evidence because of the
assumption that the jury will rely upon or be swayed by it regardless of whether its reliability has
been established.").
15. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E. 355 (1892) ("Each [party] acts
upon the theory that the interpretation is correct. Each impliedly agrees that his language may be
received through the interpreter.").
16. See Meacham v. State, 45 Fla. 71, 33 So. 983 (1903).
17. Id. at 73-74, 33 So. at 983-84 (citing Massachusetts v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E.
355 (1892)). See also Boicelli v. Giannini, 65 Cal. App. 601, 607, 224 P. 777, 779 (1924) ("An
interpreter who is selected by two persons speaking different languages ... is regarded as their
joint agent ... and the [interpreter's] statements of what they say in the presence of each other
are regarded as the statements of the persons themselves ....
[S]uch statements of the interpreter
are admissible as original evidence and are in no sense hearsay."). But see Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Giun, 131 Tex. 548, 553-54, 116 S.W.2d 693, 696 (1938) (quoting 1 WICMORE ON EVIDENCE, §
812, the court states "Ordinarily . . . the third person's words cannot be proved by anyone except
the interpreter himself.").
18. 45 Fla. at 76, 33 So. at 984.
19. Id. at 74, 33 So. at 984.
20. See id. at 73, 33 So. at 983 (citing Massachussetts v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E.
355 (1892) in which the court stated "[A] third party, who hears . . . [an interpreted] conversation,
may testify to it as he understands it, although for his understanding of what was said . . . he is
dependent on the interpretation.").
21. 45 Fla. at 74, 33 So. at 984.
22. See id., 33 So. at 983 (citing Massachusetts v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E. 355 (1892)).
23. See 45 Fla. at 74, 33 So. at 983 (citing Massachusetts v. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E.
355 (1892)).
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District courts in Florida have not consistently adhered to the Meacham analThe First District Court of Appeal rejected the agency theory in Rosell

ysis.24

v. State.25 The court reversed the defendant's conviction for possession of mar-

ijuana. 26 Without discussing Meacham, the court in dicta determined the police
officer's testimony recounting the defendant's interpreted statement was hearsay.2 7 The court characterized the agency theory as "specious," focusing on
the witness's lack of firsthand knowledge of the defendant's actual statement.28
Presumably concerned with minimizing mistakes in memory and perception,
the court implicitly balanced the policies underlying the hearsay rule against
29
the probative value of the testimony and found the former more compelling.
In State v. Letterman, an Oregon court of appeal took exception to the general
rule regarding extrajudicial translations.30 The defendant, a deaf mute, was
convicted of burglary." The primary evidence against the defendant was a police
officer's testimony recounting statements made by the defendant through an
interpreter.3 2 Defense counsel alleged error in the trial court's admission of the
officer's testimony.33 The appellate court upheld the conviction and found the
24. See Henao v. State, 454 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1984); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Ganz, 119 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1960). In State Farm, the court reversed a judgment
for interfefence with attorney-client privilege. Id. at 322. Plaintiff's testimony recounting an interpreted conversation was held as hearsay. Id. at 321. In a special concurrence, however, Judge
Pearson expressed concern that the case not be construed as holding all testimony recounting a
translated conversation is hearsay. Id. at 322. The Henao court expressly rejected State Farm's holding
and held testimony recounting a translated conversation was not hearsay. Hena, 454 So. 2d at
20. The Henao court cited State Farm as "dictum indicating [a] contrary rule without citing Meacham."
Id.
25. See 433 So. 2d 1260 (1st D.C.A. 1983), reh.
denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).
26. Id. at 1263 (The reason for reversal was state's inability to prove voluntary consent to
a warrantless search of the defendant. Since defendants did not understand English, they may have
interpreted the police officer's gesture to open a door as a demand rather than a request.).
27. Id. at 1263 ("[The] argument that the testimony is admissible because appellants adopted
the [interpreter's] statements is specious."). Why the court failed to mention Meacham is unknown.
The court did, however, cite State Farm. Id.
28. Id. ("That [adoption] argument is premised on the assumption that appellants understand
English."); see also California v. Petruzo, 13 Cal. App. 569, 574, 110 P. 324, 326 (1910) ("[A]
witness is incompetent to testify to a declaration made by a party when it is necessary to have it
translated before it can be understood [since] the witness necessarily testifies to what the interpreter
declares . . . the other- party said.").
29. See generally MCCORMICK ON EvIDENcE, supra note 11, § 246 at 730 ("[I]f the out-of-court
statement is measured against the policy underlying the hearsay rule, its evidentiary value depends
upon the credibility of the declarant .... ).
30. 47 Or. App. 1145, 1148-52, 616 P.2d 505, 507-08 (1980), aff'd, 291 Or. 3, 627 P.2d
484 (1981).
31. Id. at 1147, 616 P.2d at 506.
32. Id. After the defendant was arrested, an officer attempted to interview him. The officer,
unable to communicate with the defendant, obtained the services of an interpreter. The interpreter
translated the officer's questions from English into sign language and translated defendant's answers
from sign language into English. The officer testified that defendant had stated, through the interpreter, that he entered a post office, and stole an amplifier, two speakers, and an AM/FM
tuner. Id.
33. Id. The court recognized that "[The officer's] testimony concerning defendant's out-ofcourt statements is hearsay, that is, testimony of a statement made out of court, offered to show
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testimony admissible even though it did not fit within an established exception
to the hearsay rule." The court stated the agency theory could apply even if
the interpreter was not selected by the defendant.' Although the defendant did
not choose the interpreter,"" he nevertheless used the interpreter to communicate
7

his statements.1

The Letterman court, however, chose not to rely on an implied agency theory.
Rather, it decided to admit the officer's testimony based on a two-pronged
analysis."' The court found the evidence must both be necessary and contain
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness before it can be admitted under an
exception to the hearsay rule." The court was satisfied with the interpreter's

the truth of the matters asserted therein .... The hearsay consists of two levels: (1) the interpreter's
translation to the officer of defendant's statements; and (2) the officer's testimony of the interpreter's
translation." Id. at 1148, 616 P.2d at 507.
34. Id. ("[Tihe officer's testimony of the interpreter's translation, does not . . . fit neatly
into any of the generally recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule."). Commentators are divided
on the issue concerning extrajudicial statements made to a witness through an interpreter. See, e.g,
2 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE 9 271 (13th ed. 1972) ("[A] witness cannot testify to an extrajudicial statement by another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but translated
for him by an interpreter, as such repetition by the witness of the interpreter's statement of what
the other person said would be hearsay.").

35.

47 Or. App. at 1150, 616 P.2d at 507-08 (citing New York v. Randazzio, 194 N.Y.

147, 157, 87 N.E. 112, 116 (19(09) ("It is claimed . . . that . . . the interpreter, was not selected
by the defendant . . . still the defendant made use of him in communicating his statements . . .
[It is not essential] that the interpreter . . . be the agent of either party . . . and it matters not
whether the interpreter be selected by [the defendant] or some other person in order to make his
statement original evidence."). Contra New York v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. 419, 423, 152 N.E. 248,
249 (1926) (no agency when defendant did not select or consent to interpreter); Grocz v. Delaware

& Hudson Co., 174 App. Div. 505, 161 N.Y.S. 117, 118 (1916) (court stated that in order to
let in such recounted translated testimony, there must be an express agency through personal
selection of the interpreter).
36. 47 Or. App. at 1147, 616 P.2d at 506. Though the interpreter was called by the officer,
she was acquainted with defendant from previous contacts and had interpreted for him on previous
occasions. Id. at 1151, 616 P.2d at 508. "If nothing appears to show that respective relations to
the interpreter differ, they may be said to constitute him their joint agent to do for both that in
which they have a joint interest. . . . [Tihe words of the interpreter, which are their necessary

medium of communication, are adopted by both, and made a part of their conversation as much
as those which fall from their own lips. They cannot complain if the language of the interpreter
is taken as their own by any one who is interested in the conversation." Id. at 1151, 616 P.2d
at 508 (quoting Massachusetts N. Vose, 157 Mass. 393, 32 N.E. 355 (1892)).
37. 47 Or. App. at 1147, 616 P.2d at 506.
38. Id. at 1151, 616 P.2d at 508. See also 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §9 1421-1422, (3d ed.
1940); 6 id. § 1690 (the requisites of an exception to the hearsay rule are: (1) necessity; and (2)
circumstantial guaranty of trustworthiness).
39. 47 Or. App. at 1151, 616 P.2d at 508. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess., 18, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N~ws 7051, 7065 ("[Wlell recognized exceptions
to the hearsay rule, may not encompass every situation in which the reliability and appropriateness
of a particular piece of hearsay evidence make clear that it should be heard and considered by
the trier of fact. . . . [Tjhere are certain exceptional circumstances where evidence which is found
by a court to have guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to or exceeding the guarantees reflected
by the presently listed exceptions, and to have a high degree of prolativeness [sic] and necessity
could properly be admissible.") See also Dallas County v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 286
F.2d 388, 397-98 (5th Cir. 1961) ("We do not characterize this [evidence] as any readily identifiable
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authentication of her translation, despite her inability to recall the defendant's
answers.40 Her interpretation was found necessary and her authentication pro4
vided sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. '
The instant case provided an opportunity for Florida's Third District Court
of Appeal to clarify its position on the admissibility of recounted interpreted
testimony.4 2 In following Meacham, the instant opinion recognized an interpret-

er's words as his own.44 The court chose not to confine the agency theory to
situations where the person whose statement was translated chose the agent
himself.4 51 While acknowledging disagreement among authorities, 46 the court re-

fused to limit Meacham.47 Rosell was dismissed as a contrary rule because it
overlooked Meacham.48 The court then applied the agency analysis with minimal
49
discussion of other theories.

The interpreter in the instant case could not recall the defendant's responses.
He nevertheless testified that he truthfully translated the questions and answers
between the officer and the defendant. 5 The instant court stated the interpreter's
testimony authenticating his translation was admissible as going to the weight
[or] happily tagged species of hearsay exception. It is admissible because it is necessary and trustworthy, relevant and material, and its admission is within the trial judge's exercise of discretion...").
40. 47 Or. App. at 1147, 616 P.2d at 506; see also Heskett v. United States, 58 F.2d 897,
900 (9th Cir.) (testimony of a witness recounting translated conversation was not hearsay since the
interpreter was put on the stand), cert. denied, 287 U.S. 643, (1932); Mares v. Texas, 71 Tex.
Crim. 303, 306, 158 S.W. 1130, 1132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (testimony interpreting translated
conversation was not hearsay where interpreter testified he had truly and correctly interpreted,
although he could not remember what had been said). But see California v. John, 137 Cal. 220,
221, 69 P. 1063, 1064 (1902) (recounted translated conversation held hearsay although the interpreter
was first called and testified he accurately translated), af'd, 144 Cal. 284, 77 P. 950 (1904).
41. 47 Or. App. at 1153, 616 P.2d at 509 ("In the absence of the [officer's] testimony there
would be insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of defendant's accomplice .... The
officer's testimony is the only available source of evidence.") The court mentioned several circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness which influenced its decision: "The interpreter's qualifications
[were] unassailable, and she was familiar with the defendant and his level of communication. She
testified to the accuracy of the interpretation, and was subject to cross-examination on her methods."
Id.
42. Chzao, 453 So. 2d at 878.
43. Id. at 80 (the officer did not understand Spanish and the defendant did not understand
English).
44. Id. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
45. 453 So. 2d at 880. See supra notes 35-36. But see New York v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y.
419, 422-23, 152 N.E. 248, 249 (1926) ("[I]t [is] 'naturally' held that the party against whom the
statements [are] offered . . . has made the interpreter his agent, and therefore, ...
[is] bound by
his statements . . .").
46. 453 So. 2d at 879 ("[Tlhe authorities in this country are not in agreement as to whether
testimony recounting a translated conversation is hearsay."). See supra note 24.
47. 453 So. 2d at 879-80 ("[W]e are compelled by the lone and unaltered binding authority
of Meacham v. State, 45 Fla. 71, 33 So. 983 (1903), to hold that such testimony is not hearsay."
(footnote omitted)).
48. Id. at 880 n.3 ("We are not at liberty to follow Rosell v. State, 433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla.
1st DCA 1983 [sic]), rev. denied, 446 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984) ... which overlook[s] Meacham and
suggests a contrary rule.").
49. Id. at 880.
50. Id. at 879.
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of the officer's testimony." The court allowed the officer to testify to the conversation as he understood it because the officer's testimony was critical to the
case) 2 The court stressed the importance of the testimony since it undermined
the appellant's only defense in the case- "'
Minimizing mistakes in perception and protecting individual rights are the
paramount functions of the hearsay rule.54 The instant court failed to discuss
how these underlying policies were satisfied by admitting the officer's testimony.5" A witness's capacity to observe and receive accurate impressions, retain
them in his memory, and correctly relate them is diminished when words pass
through three separate cognitions. Variations may occur in each person's perception and subsequent narration) 6 A wide variation in perception and narration
may infringe on an individual's rights. 7 The Rosell court implicitly raised these
concerns."" The instant court, however, did not acknowledge the danger recounted translated testimony presents to the policies underlying the hearsay
rule. "
Rather than explicitly weighing the equities in the instant case, the court
propounded the agency theory as a complete exception to the hearsay rule."'
The court simply followed the holding in Meacham and declined to explain why
an implied agency theory should be applied." Although an implied agency is

51. Id. at 880 n.4 ("[The interpreter's] testimony that he accurately translated the conversation
between [the officer] and the defendant was not a required predicate to the introduction of [the
officer's] testimony, but was nonetheless admissable [sic] as going to the weight to be given to the
translated words.").
52. Id. at 879 n.l ("The [appellant's] defense was that the gun, which the [appellant] admitted
carrying but not pointing, discharged accidentally. Only the [appellant] and the victim were present
when the shooting occurred. [T~he [officer's] testimony . .. undermined the accident defense").
53.
54.

Id.
See Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. REV. 741,

743-44 (1961) (discussing how certain testimony suffers from physical and psychological weaknesses:
(1) risk of faulty perception - meant to cover every kind of fault from complete lack of observation
through all major and minor misperceptions; (2) risk of defective, confused or distorted memory;
(3) risk of a general propensity to express inexactly such memory as does exist; (4) risk that the
narrator although striving to convey account, may be incapable of exact verbalization). See also
Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticism of the Uniform Rules of Evidence 14 STAN. L REV.
682, 702 (1962).
55. 453 So. 2d at 880 (The court never mentioned hearsay policies in its analysis. It simply
cited Meacham).
56. See Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept, 62 HARV. L

REV.

177, 218 (1948) ("So long as 'hearsay' is to connote prima facie inadmissibility, we should recognize
that it would be foolish to include in hearsay all evidence that raises any one of the hearsay
risks ....

[T~he rational basis for the hearsay classification is . . . the presence of substantial risks

of insincerity and faulty narration, memory, and perception[.]").
57.

See supra note 54.

58.
59.
60.

433 So. 2d 1260 (Fla
453 So. 2d at 880.
Id.

61.

Id. See generally Advisor , Committee's Note on Fed. Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. 183,

1st D.C.a. 1983), reh'g. denied, 466 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1984).

293, 296 (1973) (801(d)(a) stating: "A statement is not hearsay if...
The statement is offered
against a party and is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity
or (B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth ....
).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss5/7

6

Gorman: Evidence: Testimony Recounting a Translated Converstation Not Hea
CASE COMMENTS

created by the acts of the accused and the interpreter, the court avoided mentioning any specific circumstances which would lead to an inference that the
interpreter was an implied agent of the appellant.
62
The instant court also failed to discuss alternate reasons for its decision.
Rather than resting the admissibility of the officer's testimony on an implied
agency theory, the court could have evaluated the officer's testimony according
to the Letterman court's two-pronged analysis. 63 The first prong, necessity, could
have been considered on two levels. The interpretation in the instant case was
necessary for communication, and the officer's testimony was necessary to prove
the case. 64 The second prong, circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, could
65
have been examined in light of the interpreter's credibility. The court could
have evaluated the interpreter's authentication and balanced it against the in66
Instead, the
terpreter's inability to recall any of the appellant's statements.
instant court implicitly found the officer's testimony necessary and surrounded
by circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness without benefit of any detailed
67
analysis.
The instant decision provides little guidance for judges making similar hearsay determinations. The court failed to analyze the particular facts of the instant
case. 6 ' Necessity and circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness are factors
which should be explicitly balanced against the probative value of the evidence
and the policies underlying the hearsay rule. 69 Ironically, the court's decision,

62. The court could have based its decision on the party-opponent exclusion. See Advisory
Commitlee's Note on Fed. Rules of Evidence 801(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. 183, 297 (1973) ("Admissions by a
party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility
...is the result of the adversary system.... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the
case of an admission. The freedom . . . from technical demands of searching for an assurance of
trustworthiness . . . calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.").
63. 47 Or. App. at 1151, 616 P.2d at 508. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.

64. 453 So. 2d 879. See supra notes 2 & 41.
65. 453 So. 2d at 879. See supra notes 4-5.
66. See FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5) ("a statement not specifically covered by any of the [hearsay]
exceptions but having ... circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" is not excluded by the
hearsay rule).
67. 453 So. 2d at 879 n.2. The court emphasized the interpreter's authentication and the
fact that the interpreter was appellant's uncle. The court also emphasized the necessity of the
officer's testimony to the outcome of the case. See supra notes 4-5, 40 & 51-52.
68. S. REP. No. 1277, supra note 39, at 18, rtprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws

at 7066 ("the special facts and circumstances which ... indicate that the statment has a sufficiently high degree of trustworthiness and necessity to justify its admission should be stated on
the record"). See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 11, S 324(1) (some recurring factors
are recognized as significant in deciding whether to apply Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5).
"Among them are: whether the statement was [made] under oath . . . [whether there was] mo-

tivation to speak truthfully or otherwise . .. and whether the declarant is now subject to cross
examination").
69. See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5) (evidence will not be excluded by the hearsay rule if "(B)
the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence"). See
supra note 67.
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devoid of guidelines, binds future courts to a restrictive exception which may
produce inequitable results.
The resulting decision, although perhaps justified in the instant case, was
achieved at the expense of detailed and conscientious analysis. The decision
may produce disparate results in the future if courts rely on the precedent while
failing to evaluate the specific facts in light of the hearsay policies. Hearsay
questions must be decided on a case-by-case basis. A general rule such as that
applied in the instant case discourages case-specific consideration. In the future,
courts should demonstrate the analysis leading to their conclusions. Only through
such a process will ultimate justice be served.
MICHELLE GORMAN
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